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Abstract 
 
We examine the information role of financial advisors by focusing on mergers and acquisitions in 
which acquiring firms hire target firms’ ex-advisors. We document that by employing targets’ ex-
advisors, acquirers pay lower takeover premiums and secure a larger proportion of merger 
synergies. The corresponding targets exhibit lower announcement returns and are less likely to be 
propositioned by competing bidders. These results indicate that acquirers take advantage of value-
relevant information about targets through targets’ ex-advisors, and achieve bargaining advantages 
in deal negotiations. In contrast, we document no discernible value effects when targets hire 
acquirers’ ex-advisors, suggesting that the information role of acquirers’ ex-advisors hired by 
targets is weaker than that of targets’ ex-advisors hired by acquirers. 
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I. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A hereafter) are typically characterized by information asymmetry 
between the merging firms. The exchange and transmission of information between deal 
participants may therefore influence several aspects of the transaction such as premium paid for 
the transaction and cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date (e.g., Finnerty, Jiao, 
and Yan, 2012). One of the main roles of investment banks is to produce and process information 
in the market for corporate control (Allen et al., 2004).1 By evaluating merging firms and providing 
technical and tactical assistance to merger rivals throughout the takeover process, advisory banks 
can become privy to “inside” information about acquiring and target firms, which includes, for 
example, growth opportunities, profit margins, customer and supplier relationships, contingent 
liabilities, labor relations, firms’ merger-related experiences, existing governance practices, and 
the willingness of target management to be acquired.  
In this paper, we empirically evaluate the materiality of information obtained by M&A advisors 
in the course of a prior firm-advisor relationship, and examine whether this information can be 
exploited or transferred in subsequent M&A transactions. In particular, we focus on M&A 
transactions in which acquiring firms hire target firms’ ex-advisors as M&A advisors, and propose 
two hypotheses regarding the information role of M&A advisors in these transactions, namely, the 
information advantage hypothesis and the deal improvement hypothesis. 
The information advantage hypothesis contends that acquirers can take advantage of value-
relevant information about target firms through hiring targets’ ex-advisors. M&A advisory teams 
garner important information about their clients via research, analysis, meetings, and 
documentations in both pre- and post-deal phases. To the extent that the value-relevant information 
                                                 
1
 We use investment banks, financial advisors, advisory banks, and advisors interchangeably throughout the paper. 
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is well retained and organized, it may be transferable and reused in subsequent deals.2 As a result, 
hiring targets’ ex-advisors may enable acquiring firms to reduce the cost of acquiring information 
about target firms, and achieve better understanding of the true value of targets and more accurate 
estimation of potential synergies. Enhanced information advantage can benefit acquirers in various 
ways. For example, Cain and Denis (2013) note that banks having prior relationship with target 
firms can provide more accurate valuation of target firms in fairness opinions. The enhanced 
knowledge and information advantage also enable acquirers to limit competition from outside 
bidders who are less informed and may have concerns about the winner’s curse (Povel and Singh, 
2006), thus reducing acquirers’ need to deter competing bidders by paying a high premium. 
Furthermore, the acquirers hiring targets’ ex-advisors may enjoy a bargaining advantage in deal 
negotiations between merging firms due to their better understanding of targets’ firm value and 
outside options. 
The deal improvement hypothesis posits a more benign motive behind acquirers’ decision to 
hire targets’ ex-advisors.  Employing an advisor with a prior relationship with the target firm may 
greatly facilitate information exchange between the target and the acquirer. As information 
conduits, targets’ ex-advisors can identify more valuable mergers and/or structure the deal to 
achieve better merger outcomes in terms of higher total synergies. For example, targets’ ex-
advisors can create value by suggesting a form of transaction that reduce acquirer/target 
shareholders’ tax liabilities, and/or keep acquirers’ exposure to targets’ hidden liabilities under 
control (e.g., Rosenbaum and Pearl, 2013).3 Targets’ ex-advisors may also be able to facilitate 
                                                 
2
 We have interviewed four investment bankers (in New York, Melbourne, Singapore, and Hong Kong, respectively) 
who have extensive experience in M&A advisory. Their responses generally support our arguments. We provide more 
detailed information from the interviews in Section II. 
3
 Higher synergies may also arise from targets’ ex-advisors helping acquirers on how to assimilate targets after the 
mergers and optimally retain key target firm management, suggesting efficient levels of autonomy for the target firm 
post-acquisition, and integrating possible differences in corporate cultures between the acquiring and target firms. 
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cooperation between merging firms, resulting in an orderly transfer of control and speedy deal 
completion. Furthermore, targets’ ex-advisors may be able to lower acquirers’ uncertainty about 
target firms’ valuation, thereby enabling acquirers to offer higher prices for acquisitions. This may 
benefit target shareholders and increase the likelihood of deal completion. 
The two hypotheses - information advantage and deal improvement - are not mutually exclusive. 
The information advantage view focuses more on the relative bargaining strength between merger 
counterparties and the wealth transfer from targets to acquirers, while the deal improvement view 
places more emphasis on the value creation caused by targets’ ex-advisors for both merging firms. 
Which view dominates the other is the primary empirical question that we aim to address in this 
paper. 
While both hypotheses predict that acquirers may have strong incentives to hire targets’ ex-
advisors, it is important to note that targets’ ex-advisors may not always agree to advise acquirers 
in the proposed merger transactions. Although there is no explicit law or regulation that prohibits 
the ex-advisors of a merging firm from providing advisory services to the merger counterparty,4 if 
the service provision is perceived as creating a channel for potentially transmitting firm-sensitive 
information, it may negatively affect advisors’ reputation in the market and even lead to litigation.5  
The potential of being sued and consequent damages to its reputation may therefore limit an 
advisor’s ability to accept advisory contracts under such circumstances. Concurrently, acquirers 
                                                 
4
 The mandated disclosure requirements under current SEC rules require disclosure of material relationships only in 
the past two years between the financial advisor and the parties to the underlying transaction and any compensation 
received as a result of that relationship. See Item 1015(b)(4) of Regulation M-A under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (Hughes and Austin, 2012). 
5
 For example, in 2003 Dana Corp, which was the target of a hostile bid by ArvinMeritor, filed a lawsuit in New York 
against UBS, which advised the acquirer. According to the lawsuit, UBS has acted as an investment banker and 
financial advisor to Dana on a "significant corporate project" since "at least" March 2002. UBS provided "substantial 
financial and investment advice" to Dana with respect to the project from March 2002 through the end of May (Dow 
Jones Corporate Filings Alert, August 5 2003). UBS was also “a major lender to Dana and gained substantial amounts 
of confidential information about Dana” (The Wall Street Journal, 5 August 2003). In the end, ArvinMeritor withdrew 
its offer on November 23, 2003 and Dana reached an out-of-court settlement (terms undisclosed) with UBS in 
December 2003. 
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would expect the managers and boards of some targets to rationally reject the merger negotiations 
as their hiring of targets’ ex-advisors may be viewed as an unfriendly strategy to weaken targets’ 
position by unveiling privy information. Thus, acquirers should rationally evaluate pros and cons 
before making the decision to hire targets’ ex-advisors. While anecdotal evidence suggests hiring 
merger counterparty’s ex-advisor results in information transmission and conflicts of interests, it 
is an open empirical question whether or not such information transmission (or conflict of interests) 
is necessarily beneficial for the hiring firm and/or detrimental to the merger counterparty. It is 
unclear whether hiring targets’ ex-advisors provides benefit to the acquiring firms ex ante, if targets 
foresee possible conflicts of interests and seek extra terms and protections from the acquiring firms. 
For example, in the presence of conflicts of interest a target with strong bargaining power may 
demand a higher premium. Moreover, even if the proposed benefits exist, the consequential 
conflicts arising between acquirer and target may dissipate these benefits, resulting in an overall 
loss in value. Mehran and Stulz (2007) also suggest that market participants appear to consider 
conflicts of interest when making their decisions. 
Using a sample of 3,251 mergers and acquisitions undertaken between US-domiciled publicly 
listed firms during the period 1985-2008, we find that 9.6% of acquirers hire targets’ ex-advisors 
to advise on the deals, given that target firms hired merger advisors in the past transactions. When 
the advisor choice is analyzed in a multivariate setting, we find that acquirers’ propensity to hire 
targets’ ex-advisors is positively related to the number of M&A advisors hired by targets in the 
past five years and for diversifying mergers, but negatively associated with acquirers’ merger 
expertise in targets’ industry. Additionally, longer and more recent relationship between targets 
and their ex-advisors increases the potential for acquirers to hire the targets’ ex-advisors, while 
acquirers’ propensity to hire target’s ex-advisors drops if some of the targets’ ex-advisors have 
merged since their last engagements with targets. These results are generally consistent with the 
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view that acquirers rationally balance the costs and benefits of hiring targets’ ex-advisors when 
choosing advisors. 
We then examine the consequences of acquirers hiring targets’ ex-advisors by examining the 
likelihood of competing bids, the premium paid by the acquirer to the target, and the announcement 
returns. Our results show that acquirers’ hiring of targets’ ex-advisors significantly reduces both 
the likelihood and the number of competing bids, indicating that this decision deters less informed 
bidders from entering the contest. Moreover, after controlling for known determinants of premium 
and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), acquirers’ decision to hire targets’ ex-advisors lowers 
both the premium paid to the targets and the targets’ CAR by roughly 0.06, which is both 
economically and statistically significant. Collectively, these results support the information 
advantage view that the hiring of targets’ ex-advisors provides the acquirers with a bargaining 
advantage and allows them to acquire the target firms at a more attractive price. 
We do not find evidence in support of the deal improvement hypothesis, which predicts that 
the combined wealth gain and the likelihood of deal completion should be positively related to the 
hiring of targets’ ex-advisors. Specifically, we document that acquirers’ decision to hire targets’ 
ex-advisors has no significant impact on the value of synergistic gains, which is measured as the 
combined abnormal announcement returns to acquirers and targets, long-term post-acquisition 
stock performance of the combined firm, the likelihood of deal completion, and time to resolution. 
Although targets’ ex-advisors do not increase the value of total synergies, we find evidence that 
they enable acquiring (target) firms to obtain a greater (smaller) fraction of synergies, which is 
consistent with acquirers’ enhanced bargaining ability as suggested by the information advantage 
hypothesis.  
We perform a variety of checks to ensure that our main results are robust to alternative model 
specifications and variable definitions. In particular, all our results continue to hold after 
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controlling for endogeneity using the two-stage Heckman (1979) procedure. Furthermore, we 
conduct simulation analysis to address the concern that our findings may be driven by the market 
share of target firms’ ex-advisors. Taken together, our findings favor the interpretation that when 
an acquirer hires the target’s ex-advisor, valuable information is conveyed to the acquirer, leading 
the acquirer to possess greater bargaining power in merger negotiations and reducing the degree of 
competition from less informed bidders. 
Last but not least, we also examine the advisor choice from target firms’ perspective. Can target 
firms achieve information or bargaining advantage by hiring acquirers’ ex-advisors? The short 
answer to this question is no. Our analysis reveals that the hiring ex-advisors of acquirers does not 
influence targets’ or acquiring firms’ CAR, premiums paid by acquirers, the dollar value of 
synergies, and the targets’ share of total synergy gains. These results, although standing in sharp 
contrast to the value effects of acquirers hiring targets’ ex-advisors, are possibly driven by the 
asymmetric feature of M&A transactions: acquiring firms continue to survive after acquisitions, 
while targets normally cease to exist as standalone companies after successful mergers. As a result, 
while acquirers can use the promise (or lure) of future business to motivate targets’ ex-advisors to 
work hard on their behalf, target firms cannot offer the same incentives to acquirers’ ex-advisors.6 
Furthermore, acquirers’ ex-advisors hired by targets may also be concerned about losing future 
business from the acquirers if their involvement reduces acquirers’ overall gain from the mergers. 
Thus, the information role of acquirers’ ex-advisors hired by targets should be weaker than that of 
targets’ ex-advisors hired by acquirers. 
Our paper contributes to the extant literature in three ways. First, we provide new evidence of 
the value effect of advisor choice in M&As. To the best of our knowledge, we are among the first 
                                                 
6
 In our sample, roughly 58% of these banks (target’s ex-advisors) are hired by acquirers in future transactions as M&A 
advisors. 
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to show that acquirers hiring targets’ ex-advisors has a significant impact on merger outcomes. 
Second, our analysis reveals that hiring targets’ ex-advisors reduces competition from other 
potential rival bidders. This economic function of ex-advisors is similar to that of a toehold in terms 
of increasing acquirers’ bidding advantage and reducing takeover competition.7  Finally, prior 
studies have well documented that the bank-firm prior relationship is beneficial for both investment 
banks and firms.8 Our results reveal that a prior bank-firm relationship can be exploited by potential 
bidders, putting target firms in a disadvantageous position on the bargaining table. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II briefly reviews the relevant literature. 
Section III describes our sample and variable constructions. Main results are presented in Section 
IV, followed by robustness checks in Section V. Section VI concludes.  
 
II. A Brief Literature Review 
The role of investment banks has long been discussed in the literature. Early theoretical studies 
focus on the role of investment banks as an agent to collect information and as a mediator to resolve 
the problems of information asymmetry in financial markets (e.g. Beatty and Ritter 1986; 
Benvensite and Spindt 1989). Although investment banks may have incentives to collude with the 
clients they represent, they also have incentives to build up reputation by setting standards to 
evaluate their clients so as to gain a bigger market share (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). 
Empirical studies on initial public offerings, such as Carter and Manaster (1990), Carter, Dark, and 
                                                 
7
 Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2009) suggest that a toehold can reduce takeover competition if it exceeds a certain 
threshold. Relatedly, Boone and Mulherin (2007) document termination provisions increase takeover competition. 
Boone and Mulherin (2011) find that the formation of private equity consortiums has no negative effect on takeover 
competition.  
8
 James (1992) finds that the marginal cost of the repeated underwriting business with the same firm is lower. 
Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006, 2009) examine U.S. debt and equity offerings completed between 1993 and 
2002 for prior bank-firm relationships, and conclude that prior underwriting relationships increase the likelihood of 
winning a lead-underwriting contract. Francis, Hasan, and Sun (2014) find that acquirers’ past relationships with their 
advisors have a significant impact on their current choice of M&A advisors. 
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Singh (1998), and Benveniste et al. (2003), confirm the role of investment banks as information 
providers. 
Given the relative infrequency of mergers and acquisitions, the role of financial advisors as 
information conduits is particularly important (Sleptsov, Anand, and Vasudeva, 2013). Empirical 
studies on mergers and acquisitions further suggest that investment banks facilitate information 
sharing among acquirers and targets. Ivashina et al. (2009) examine the influence of lending banks 
on the likelihood of a client firm becoming a takeover target, whereby the acquirer is also a client 
of the same bank. This effect is stronger the higher the number of same-industry clients served by 
the bank, further suggesting that lending banks play a significant role by transmitting target specific 
information (generated during normal course of lending) to acquirers. Agrawal et al. (2013) also 
examine the role of advisors as conduits for information transmission by studying merger cases 
where the same advisor advises both the acquirer and the target.9  
Prior studies, however, agree less on the overall benefits from information sharing between 
acquirers and targets. Though information sharing may allow investment banks’ to exercise better 
judgement and provide higher quality services, they may also abuse their market power and 
information advantage for private benefits. Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009) document that 
financial advisors can take a direct stake in the targets (to generate a profit) and thus exploit the 
private information they are privy to. Agrawal et al. (2013) find that the presence of “common 
advisors”, however, does not lead to better overall deal outcomes compared with deals advised by 
separate advisors. Besides, information sharing may shift the bargaining power between acquirers 
                                                 
9
 Previous studies also suggest that other financial intermediaries can serve as information conduits to allow the 
acquirer to reduce information asymmetry about the target. For example, Gompers and Xuan (2009) show that common 
VC alleviate asymmetric information between public acquirers and private targets. The deals with common VC are 
associated with more positive acquirers’ CAR. Cai and Sevilir (2012) suggest that having a board connection may 
improve information flow and communications between acquirer and target. Ferreira, Massa, and Matos (2010) find 
foreign institutions facilitate international M&A deals and reduce information asymmetry between the merging firms. 
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and targets. Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) argue that a firm’s strategically sensitive information (e.g. 
operational efficiency, customer/supplier relationships, progress on research and development 
projects etc.) is valuable to product-market rivals and may inhibit sharing of underwriters between 
large firms in an industry. The same logic can be extended to mergers. On the bargaining table, if 
the ex-advisor of one company serves the other, the company losing its advisor may lose bargaining 
power and is thus less likely to achieve a favourable outcome. Indeed, Agrawal et al. (2013) find 
that common advisors generally lean toward the acquirers rather than the targets. As illustrated by 
the previously cited example of the lawsuit between Dana Corp. and UBS, concerns about 
information leakage may especially be valid in hostile deals whereby a merging firm engages the 
services of the merger counterparty’s ex-bank. Calomiris and Singer (2004) document 52 instances 
of large (target value > $1 billion) hostile takeovers and suggest that buyers who are advised by 
banks with prior relationship with targets may be more discriminating in selecting their targets and 
in price offered. While primarily concerned with advisor choice, in a recent study Song, Wei, and 
Zhou (2013) report that acquirers are more likely to choose boutique advisors (over traditional full 
service advisors) in complex deals, and this is associated with both longer duration and the payment 
of lower premiums.  
We are among the first to study whether and how the information obtained by M&A advisors 
in the course of a prior firm-advisor relationship can be exploited or transferred in subsequent 
M&A transactions. We note that financial advisors, however, are governed by non-disclosure 
agreements with their clients to maintain confidentiality. For example, a financial advisor should 
refrain from using non-public information in performing precedent transactions analysis if it is 
privy to the information because of engagements in some of the comparable deals (Rosenbaum and 
Pearl, 2013). On the other hand, our interviews with investment bankers suggest that non-disclosure 
agreements are typically valid for 1-2 years only. After the agreements expire, any further 
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restrictions disallowing the use of this information would severely reduce the banks’ 
competitiveness. In addition, information sharing (transfer) across M&A deals via informal 
channels is plausible because it is not readily observable and verifiable by former clients. The 
transmission of information is strongly dependent on the continued involvement of the same 
bankers across deals. Only in the extreme case – where the entire team has left the ex-advisor – 
may the information be irretrievably lost. Frequent investment bank mergers and high turnover 
rates for bankers certainly dampen explicit knowledge transfer across deals, but they work against 
our ability to identify the value effects of hiring targets’ ex-advisors on deal outcomes. The 
importance of investment bankers in acquisitions is also evidenced by Chemmanur, Ertugrul, and 
Krishnan (2014) who document that investment banker fixed-effects explains a large fraction of 
the variation in deal outcomes, over and above the investment bank fixed-effects. Taken together, 
prior studies and our interviews with bankers suggest that information transfer across M&A deals 
is indeed plausible. 
 
III. Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics 
A. Sample and Data 
Our sample is retrieved from the SDC/Platinum database and includes mergers and acquisitions 
between U.S. firms between January 1985 and December 2008. We include both completed and 
withdrawn deals that involve publicly listed acquirers and targets. We exclude buybacks, exchange 
offers, and recapitalizations, and privatizations in which acquirers and targets have the same CUSIP. 
We require that acquirers own less than 50% of targets’ shares before the announcement date and 
own 100% after deal completion. We exclude deals that are worth less than 1% of the acquiring 
firm’s market value of equity. Also excluded are transactions with no deal value disclosed. 
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When collecting the advisor information from the SDC/Platinum database, the sample banks 
are selected by forming a union of two groups of banks: (1) the sample of Ljungqvist, Marston, 
and Wilhelm (2006); and (2) the sample of 50 most active banks in M&A activities by transaction 
value over the period 1985 to 2008. As SDC/Platinum sometimes reports multiple codes for the 
same bank, we manually check these codes and combine them into a single code if they belong to 
the same bank. To account for major bank mergers during the study period, we utilize the data 
provided in Corwin and Schultz (2005) and Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006), and the data 
supplemented by SDC/Platinum and other financial news sources, which include LexisNexis 
Newswires, Yahoo! Finance, Google, and ProQuest Newspapers. Appendix A lists the final set of 
survival banks, together with their predecessors, during the sample period. The number of 
candidate banks varies from 57 to 107 over time, depending on past mergers and the date a bank 
first appears in SDC/Platinum. We restrict our sample to deals in which each acquirer employs at 
least one advisor from the list in Appendix A. These sampling criteria yield a final sample of 3,251 
M&A transactions, among which 760 targets have ex-advisors from past M&A transactions. 
Among these 760 deals, targets re-hire their former advisors in 394 deals. 
Furthermore, we retrieve financial data from the Compustat Industrial Annual database and 
obtain stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) files.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for market shares of the twenty five most active financial 
advisors for acquiring firms in our sample. We rank them based on the total value of all transactions 
(column (1)) advised by the surviving bank and its predecessors. Following Golubov, Petmezas, 
and Travlos (2012), we refer to the top eight investment banks as top-tier, and all other advisors as 
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non-top-tier.10 Column (2) reports the total number of transactions. If there are multiple advisors 
for an acquirer in a merger, each advisor is allocated a 1/n share of value in column (1) or a count 
of 1/n in column (2), where n is the number of advisors hired by the acquirer for a transaction. 
Column (1) suggests that Bank of America Merrill Lynch is the most active M&A advisor for 
acquiring firms based on the total value of transactions advised over the period 1985-2008, 
followed by JP Morgan, and Citigroup. Column (3) reports the number of M&A transactions in 
which target firms hired advisors during the past five years (e.g., TargetHasEx = 1). Column (4) 
shows the number of deals in which the acquiring firm’s advisor advised the target firm in M&A 
transactions during the past five years (e.g., HireTargetEx = 1). In our sample, acquirers hire targets’ 
ex-advisors in 73 deals, which account for 9.6% of 760 deals in which target firms have ex-advisors 
and 2.2% of all deals (3,251). Although, the 73 deals that involve acquirers hiring targets’ ex-
advisors only account for 2.2% of all deals, they represent for 9.5% of total deal value. In other 
words, those deals are indeed larger than a typical deal. For example, Peregrine hired Deutsche 
Bank as its M&A advisor when it acquired Harbinger in 2000. Deutsche Bank had, in the past, 
acted as an advisor for Harbinger. Similarly, when News Corporation acquired Dow Jones 
Company in 2007, it employed JP Morgan who had rendered advisory services to the target in the 
past. Appendix B tabulates the distribution of all deals in our sample by year. 
 
B. Key Variables 
                                                 
10
 Note that the ranking reported in Table 1 may be different from that given by the SDC league tables because when 
calculating the number of deals advised by an advisor, we include all deals advised by the bank and its predecessors. 
In addition, the top eight investment banks are slightly different from those of Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012). 
Lazard and UBS rank number 8 and 9 in their Table I, but rank number 9 and 8, respectively, in our sample. The 
discrepancy is caused by the difference in sample period between theirs (1996-2009) and ours (1985-2008). 
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The key variable of our interest, HireTargetEx, is equal to one if the acquiring firm hires an 
advisor who advised the target firm in M&A transactions during the past five years, and zero 
otherwise. As an important control variable, TargetHasEx, is set equal to one if the target firm has 
ex-advisors during the past five years, and zero otherwise. We include TargetHasEx as an 
explanatory variable in regressions to account for the fact that some targets may not have ex-
advisors for acquirers to choose from. 
We utilize the following variables to measure the deal outcomes. Cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARAcquirer and CARTarget) are defined for the acquirer and the target, respectively, from one day 
before to one day after the announcement date of the M&A (e.g., Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki, 
2011). We employ a standard event study methodology to measure abnormal announcement day 
returns. To estimate the market model, we use 200 trading days of stock returns, beginning 205 
days before and ending 6 days before the M&A announcement date. The CRSP value-weighted 
return is used as the market return. Using the CRSP equally-weighted returns yields qualitatively 
similar results. 
Following Bates and Becher (2011), we measure the premium paid to the target by the acquirer 
(Premium) as the initial offer price (or final offer price if initial offer price unavailable) as reported 
by SDC, deflated by the share price of the target firm at five trading days preceding the 
announcement date, less one. Moreover, to minimize the impact of extreme values and misrecorded 
data, we follow Bates and Becher (2011) and eliminate the transactions where premium is less than 
-20% and then winsorize Premium at the top and bottom 5% of its distribution.  
We follow Bates, Lemmon, and Linck (2006) and estimate the total dollar-denominated 
synergy (Synergy) as follows. 
            
( )1 ,Acquirer Acquirer Target TargetSynergy MV CAR MV CARα= × + − ×
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where MV is the market value of equity two days prior to the announcement, CARAcquirer and 
CARTarget are the cumulative abnormal returns defined above, and α is the toehold of the acquirer. 
Following Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) and Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012), we calculate 
the acquirer’s and target’s share of synergies (ASOS and TSOS), respectively, as follows. 
, 0
1 , 0
Acquirer Acquirer
Acquirer Acquirer
MV CAR if Synergy
Synergy
ASOS
MV CAR if Synergy
Synergy
 × >=  × − <
 
(1 )
, 0
(1 )1 , 0
Target Target
Target Target
MV CAR if Synergy
Synergy
TSOS
MV CAR if Synergy
Synergy
α
α
 − × >=  − × − <
 
Bates, Lemmon, and Linck (2006) point out the importance of addressing the outliers as some 
deals with small synergies can produce extreme values in ASOS and TSOS. We thus follow 
Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012) and winsorize these three measures at at the top and bottom 
5% of their distributions. When used as a dependent variable in the regression analysis, Synergy is 
deflated by acquirer’s market value of equity two days prior to the merger announcement. 
 
C. Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the deal characteristics for the whole sample in columns 1-3. 
On average, acquirers offer a 31 percent premium to purchase targets’ shares. The mean value of 
synergy as a percentage of the pre-bid market capitalization of the acquiring firm is around 1%. 
The mean three-day CAR for acquirers is -2% while the mean CAR for targets is 18%. The mean 
values of TSOS and ASOS indicate that targets capture most of the synergy in M&A transactions. 
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These statistics are consistent with previous studies that suggest although M&A creates value on 
average, the value created primarily accrues to the target firms (e.g., Bruner 2004).  
Furthermore, we consider three indicators for tender offers, diversifying mergers, and hostile 
transactions respectively. An acquisition is defined as a diversifying one if the acquirer and target 
have different four-digit SIC codes. Percentage of Cash is defined as the percentage of deal value 
that is paid with cash. Also reported is Relative Size, which is defined as the transaction value 
divided by acquirer’s market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition 
announcement. In terms of median relative size, the deal value amounts to 36% of the acquirer’s 
pre-merger market value of equity. Of all the bids about 19% and 6% of transactions are tender 
offers and hostile takeovers, respectively. Further, about 48% of the transactions are diversifying 
mergers. Finally, in a typical transaction, the acquirer finances the deal with 35% of cash.  
In columns 4-7, we divide the transactions into two groups according to whether the acquirer’s 
advisor advised the target firm in M&A transactions (HireTargetEx = 1) or not (HireTargetEx = 0) 
during the past five years. Comparing two subsamples, we find that deals in which acquirers hire 
targets’ ex-advisors exhibit lower CAR for target firms, lower premium, lower synergy, and a lower 
percentage of cash payment. Nevertheless, target shareholders still earn a substantially positive 
(0.13) abnormal announcement returns when acquirers hiring target firms’ ex-advisors. In dollar 
terms, the average reductions in target CAR and premiums received are $181.2 million and $265.6 
million respectively. The statistics are generally consistent with our expectation that by hiring 
targets’ ex-advisors, acquirers can gain bargaining advantage in deal negotiations.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Panel B reports summary statistics of firm characteristics that are included as control variables 
in regressions. Specially, we include leverage ratio (Leverage), the natural logarithm of total assets 
(Ln(Assets)), the market to book ratio (M/B), and free cash flow (CashFlow) of both acquirers and 
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targets. The dollar values (in millions) of total assets are converted into 2000 constant dollars using 
the GDP deflator. Leverage is defined as total debt/total assets. M/B is the market to book assets 
ratio. CashFlow is (Net Income + Depreciation - Capital Expenditure)/Assets. To mitigate the 
impact of outliers or misrecorded data on the results, all firm characteristics are winsorized at the 
0.5% level at both tails of the distribution. Compared with deals with HireTargetEx = 0, deals with 
HireTargetEx = 1 involves acquirers and target firms that are larger in terms of total assets. Target 
firms with ex-advisors being hired by acquirers have higher financial leverage, and lower market-
to-book-ratios.  
 
IV. Main Results 
A. Determinants of Hiring Targets’ Ex-advisors 
We first model acquiring firms’ advisor choice as a function of deal, advisor, and firm 
characteristics. If the choice to hire targets’ ex-advisors is purely a random event, we should not 
expect the choice to be affected by such characteristics. Specifically, we estimate the following 
probit model.11 
0 1Prob.[  1]  ( )HireTargetEx F a a X= = + ,    (1) 
where Prob. stands for the probability of hiring targets’ ex-advisors, F denotes the normal 
cumulative distribution function, and X is a set of deal, advisor, and firm characteristics that have 
been shown by previous studies to affect the advisor choice. This analysis can also help us deal 
                                                 
11
 A potential problem of using a probit model for the advisor choice is that the unconditional probability of acquirers 
hiring targets’ ex-advisors is low (around 2.2%). In other words, hiring merger counterparty’s ex-advisors is a rare 
event. King and Zeng (2001) argue that the use of traditional binary choices models will underestimate the probability 
of rare events. To correct for the bias, we use the rare event Logistic Regression developed by King and Zeng (2001) 
to re-estimate the regressions for Table 3 and column (1) of Table 4 and find that our results are essentially the same.  
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with the potential endogenous relation between the choice of hiring targets’ ex-advisors and deal 
outcomes analyzed in Section V. A. 
We consider the following deal, advisor, and firm characteristics as explanatory variables in 
equation (1): (1) the number of M&A advisors hired by the target firm in the five years prior to the 
deal; (2) the number of advisors hired by the acquirer in the current deal; (3) the acquirer’s expertise 
in the target’s industry, which is defined as the number of mergers done by an acquirer in its target’s 
four-digit SIC industry divided by the total number of mergers in the industry involved during the 
past five years;12 (4) bargaining power between the acquirer and the target, which is defined as the 
ratio of the natural logarithm of total assets of the acquirer to that of the target; (5) relative deal 
size, which is defined as the deal value divided by the acquirer’s market value of equity at the end 
of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition announcement; (6) percentage of deal value that is paid 
with cash; and (7) three indicator variables for tender offers, diversifying mergers, and hostile 
takeovers.  
Additionally, we construct three variables Recency, Duration, and BankMerged to measure the 
closeness of the relationship between targets’ and their ex-advisors. We expect acquirers are more 
likely to obtain value-relevant information and therefore more likely to hire targets’ ex-advisors if 
the target-advisor relationship is longer and more recent. Specifically, we define the duration of a 
deal as the time elapsed (in years) between the announcement date and the completion date, divided 
by five. Further, for a current deal under consideration, the recency of relationship between the 
target and its ex-advisor is defined as five minus the time elapsed (in years) between the origination 
date of the relationship and the announcement date of the current deal. For example, suppose the 
                                                 
12
 We follow Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) and define industry expertise variables using four-digit SIC codes. For 
consistency, we define diversifying mergers using four-digit SIC codes as well. However, our results are not sensitive 
to this choice. Our robustness checks (untabulated but available upon request) suggest that using three-digit SIC codes 
generates qualitatively the same results.  
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current deal was announced on Jan 1, 2005. The target previously hired Bank A on Jan 1, 2002 and 
finished the deal on June 30, 2002. In this case, duration is 0.6/5 and recency is (5-3)/5 = 2/5. As 
we only consider mergers within past five years for the current deal, both duration and recency take 
a maximum value of one. For a current deal under consideration, we compute, Duration and 
Recency, as the average duration and recency of all target’s ex-advisors within past five years. 
However, two factors may affect acquirers’ decision to hire targets’ ex-advisors. First, targets’ 
advisors are subject to non-disclosure agreements that are typically valid for one to two years. It is 
possible that acquirers may avoid targets’ ex-advisors who have very recent relationship with the 
targets. Therefore, for deals within previous two years, we set recency of the deal to zero. In other 
words, Recency is calculated based on targets’ deals that took place within two to five years before 
the current deal that is under consideration.13 Second, turnovers of advisory teams may cause 
significant dissipation of information. Although we cannot observe turnovers of advisory teams 
directly, we expect significant turnovers are likely to exist when two banks merge with each other. 
Therefore, we define an indicator variable that equals one if one of the target’s ex-advisors has 
merged since its previous engagement with the target. Then, for a current deal under consideration, 
we compute, BankMerged, as the ratio of all bank mergers related to all target’s ex-advisors within 
past five years. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 presents the results from estimating equation (1) for acquiring firms. We find that 
acquirers’ probability of hiring targets’ ex-advisors is positively related to the number of advisors 
hired by target firms in the past five years and for diversifying mergers, but negatively associated 
with acquirers’ merger expertise in targets’ industry. More importantly, the probability of acquirers 
                                                 
13
 For 73 deals in which acquirer hires target’s ex-advisors, only 8 of them include advisors who advised the targets in 
the previous 2 years. 
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hiring targets’ ex-advisors increases with both Recency and Duration. The finding suggests that 
longer and more recent relationship between targets and their ex-advisors increases the potential 
for acquirers to obtain value-relevant information from the targets’ ex-advisors. Acquirers’ 
propensity to hire target’s ex-advisors drops if some of the targets’ ex-advisors have merged since 
their last engagements with targets. This result is consistent with the notion that bank mergers 
result in dissipation of information (making them less attractive) due to turnover of advisory teams. 
Other explanatory variables are statistically insignificant in the regression. The pseudo-R2 in 
column 5 indicates that the model explains up to 35% of acquirers’ choice to hire targets’ ex-
advisors.14  Note, however, that our main objective here is not to identify a complete list of 
determinants that affect acquirers’ choice to hire targets’ ex-advisors, but rather to identify 
variables that are correlated with the advisor choice in order to address the endogeneity issues 
discussed in Section V.A. 
  
B. The Effect of Hiring Targets’ Ex-advisors on Takeover Competition 
Table 4 examines whether hiring targets’ ex-advisors can reduce takeover competition. We 
employ two proxies for takeover competition: the likelihood of having competing bidders and the 
number of competing bidders. Specifically, in column (1) of Table 4, we estimate a probit model 
where the dependent variable (MultiBidder) is equal to one if any competing bidder exists, and 
zero otherwise. We report the marginal effects that measure the effect of a one unit change in the 
continuous explanatory variables (moving from zero to one for dummy variables) on the dependent 
                                                 
14
 Note that the numbers of observations in Tables 4-6 are smaller than that in Table 3 because of the missing values 
of dependent and explanatory variables in Tables 4-6. As a robustness check, we exclude observations with missing 
value of any dependent and explanatory variables in Tables 4-6 and find similar regression results (reported in Panel 
D of Table 7). 
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variable. In column (2) of Table 4, we estimate the negative binomial regression model, in which 
the dependent variable is the number of competing bidders (NBidders).  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
In addition to including HireTargetEx and TargetHasEx, we control for the targets’ firm 
characteristics described in Section III. In addition, we consider three additional controls that have 
shown by previous studies (e.g., Jennings and Mazeo 1993; Betton and Eckbo 2000) to influence 
takeover competition. Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2009) suggest that a toehold can reduce 
takeover competition if it exceeds a certain threshold. We therefore incorporate a toehold dummy 
which is set equal to one if toehold is larger than 5%, and zero otherwise. 15 Premium is included 
because it can be correlated with the level of (potential or realized) competition in a transaction in 
different ways. On one hand, Jennings and Mazeo (1993) find that a higher premium can deter 
competing offers, implying a negative effect of Premium on the presence of multiple bidders. On 
the other hand, the presence of multiple bidders may strengthen a target’s bargaining power, thus 
allowing it to extract a higher premium.16 Also included is the percentage of cash paid to the target 
firm.17 Fishman (1989) argues that cash payment pre-empts competing bids, while Jennings and 
Mazeo (1993) document that cash payment is positively related to takeover competition. 
The result reported in column (1) of Table 4 suggests that rival bidders are less likely to 
materialize if acquirers hire targets’ former advisors. The coefficient of HireTargetEx is negative 
and significant at the 5% level. It indicates that hiring targets’ ex-advisors can reduce the likelihood 
                                                 
15
 Once a company purchases 5% or more of another company, it must file Form 13D with the SEC and explain to the 
target firm in writing the reason for the purchase of 5% or more of its stock. Filing form 13D additionally notifies the 
public as to what the company intends to do with the toehold purchase. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) also 
use 5% as the cutoff when defining the toehold dummy.  
16
 Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) and Servaes (1991), for example, find that target’s abnormal return from the day 
before merger announcement through resolution is significantly higher for deals with multiple bidders than deals with 
a single bidder. 
17
 All our results are qualitatively the same if a dummy variable for pure-cash transactions is used instead. 
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of having competing bidders by 3%. Given that the unconditional probability for any deal in our 
sample to involve multiple bidders is 9.2%, this magnitude represents an economically meaningful 
effect. Column (2) of Table 4 reveals that hiring ex-advisors of targets also negatively affects the 
number of rival bidders. Taken together, the results in Table 4 are consistent with the notion that 
hiring targets’ ex-advisors improves acquirers’ information advantage and reduces takeover 
competition by deterring potential rival bidders from participating. 18  However, we cannot 
completely rule out additional factors that may also play a role in deterring competing bidders such 
as deal complexity, asset specificity, and other acquirer, target and bank characteristics that are 
unobservable to the researchers. We address the omitted variable bias in our robustness checks in 
Section V.     
The coefficients of other explanatory variables are generally consistent with those documented 
by previous studies. Consistent with Jennings and Mazeo (1993), we find that the existence of 
toehold reduces the level of takeover competition, and that the fraction of payment by cash is 
positively related to takeover competition. Additionally, the level of takeover competition is 
positively related to the firm size of target companies, and negatively associated with the leverage 
ratio and the market-to-book ratio of target firms. 
 
C. The Effect of Hiring Targets’ Ex-advisors on Deal Outcomes 
In this subsection, we first examine the effect of hiring targets’ ex-advisors on the 
announcement returns for acquiring and target firms, respectively. We then investigate whether 
such hiring decisions affect the premium paid to target firms by acquirers. Finally, we study 
                                                 
18
 Due to missing values of dependent and explanatory variables, the number of observations in Table 4 is 1,736. 
Among these 1,736 cases, acquirers hire targets’ ex-advisors in 43 deals, which accounts for 9.8% of 441 deals in 
which target firms have ex-advisors.  
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synergies created by mergers and acquisitions and how they are divided between acquirers and 
target firms. 
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, we separately regress targets’ and acquirers’ CAR on 
HireTargetEx, TargetHasEx, deal characteristics, and firm characteristics. 19  Specifically, to 
control for deal characteristics, we include Tender Offer, Relative Size, Diversify, Hostile, and 
Percentage of Cash. Tender Offer is included because Bates and Lemmon (2003) and Officer (2003) 
find that acquirers’ CAR is higher for tender offer. We include Relative Size because Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) show that bidder announcement returns increase with relative deal 
size. We include Diversify since Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) show that bidders earn 
negative returns when making unrelated acquisitions. Schwert (2000) finds that acquirers realize 
lower abnormal returns in hostile takeovers, so we include Hostile, which equals one if the SDC 
classifies the acquisition as a hostile takeover and zero if the SDC classifies the acquisition as a 
friendly takeover. Since cash (stock) is more likely to be used as a method of payment when there 
is low (high) valuation uncertainty in the acquisition (Travlos (1987), Loughran and Vijh (1997)), 
we also control for Percentage of Cash in the regression. Coefficients are estimated from ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regressions. The t-statistics are calculated using Huber/White/Sandwich 
heteroskedastic consistent errors. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Column (1) of Table 5 reveals that targets’ CAR is significantly and negatively related to 
acquirers’ decision to hire targets’ ex-advisors. This is consistent with the “information advantage” 
argument outlined in Section I. In terms of economic significance, this decision lowers target’s 
                                                 
19
 CAR is measured from one day before to one day after the announcement date. Using either the abnormal return on 
the announcement day or the cumulative abnormal return from two days before to two days after the announcement 
date as the dependent variable does not change our main results. 
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CAR by 0.06, which amounts to 1/3 of the average CAR (0.18) for all target firms across all 
transactions in our sample. This result also suggests that investors may be sophisticated enough to 
recognize that targets’ ex-advisors can cause damage to target firms when they are hired by 
acquirers in M&A transactions.  
Column (2) shows that acquirers’ CAR is not significantly unrelated to its decision to hire 
targets’ ex-advisors. The estimated coefficient of HireTargetEx is 0.01 with t-statistic being 0.5. 
Although we postulated that hiring targets’ former advisors may provide acquirers with 
competitive edge in the bidding process, the results suggest that this decision does not create value 
for acquirers’ shareholders. We interpret it as the evidence supporting the competitive market 
hypothesis proposed by Boone and Mulherin (2008) who document no significant relation between 
bidders’ stock returns and the level of merger competition.20 The hypothesis maintains that in a 
merger, the presence of actual or potential competition leads to efficient pricing of the target and 
results in zero profits to the winning bidder. In other words, in a competitive takeover market, 
winning acquirers rationally respond to the level of takeover competition and the uncertainty 
associated with target firms’ value. Although rational acquirers can reduce the level of takeover 
competition through hiring targets’ ex-advisors, they earn breakeven returns because the entire 
takeover market is competitive and efficient. The negative coefficient of TargetHasEx indicates 
that when targets’ ex-advisors are available, and if acquirers do not hire targets’ ex-advisors, 
acquirers’ CAR is lower than otherwise.  
The coefficients on other explanatory variables are generally consistent with the findings in 
prior studies. Consistent with Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), we find that glamour 
                                                 
20
 Specifically, Boone and Mulherin (2008) argue that the winning acquirer does not make systematic errors in adapting 
its strategy to the level of competition and uncertainty regarding target value, and hence no relation should exist 
between acquirer returns and either the number of bidders or the uncertainty in target values. 
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acquirers experience more negative CAR. We also find acquirers’ CAR is higher for deals financed 
by more cash, consistent with Travlos (1987) and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002). Besides, 
targets’ CAR is higher in hostile deals and deals financed by more cash, consistent with Andrade, 
Mitchell, and Stafford (2001). Target firms with low M/B and high free cash flows experience 
more positive CAR, consistent with Manne (1965) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972) who show that 
corporate takeovers can be used to create shareholder value by eliminating poorly performing 
managers.  
Column (1) of Table 6 reports the regression results for premiums paid by acquirers. Following 
Bates and Becher (2011), we include in the regression firm characteristics (Ln(Assets), M/B, 
Leverage, CashFlow) as control variables. To account for deal characteristics, we include three 
indicator variables for tender offers, diversifying mergers, and hostile transactions, together with 
percentage of deal value that is paid with cash. We also control for relative size and adjust standard 
errors for heteroskedasticity and correlation across observations for a given deal. The constant term, 
year fixed effects and industry fixed effects are also included but not reported in the table. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
We document that takeover premium is negatively related to acquirers’ decision to hire targets’ 
ex-advisors. The coefficient of -0.06 indicates that hiring targets’ ex-advisors lowers the premium 
paid to targets by 0.06, which is about 20% of the average premium (0.31) across all transactions 
in our sample. This result is consistent with the view that the competitive advantage gained from 
hiring targets’ ex-advisors reduces acquirers’ incentive to offer a higher premium in order to deter 
a competing bidder. Furthermore, hiring targets’ ex-advisors enables acquirers to better estimate 
the value of target firms and thus reduce the risk of overpayment.  
In column (2) of Table 6, we use the total dollar value of synergy, scaled by the pre-bid market 
capitalization of the acquiring firm, as the dependent variable. The results reveal that hiring targets’ 
   26  
ex-advisors does not affect the total synergy. This is inconsistent with the “deal improvement” 
hypothesis which predicts that targets’ ex-advisors act as information conduits and use their 
information advantage to improve deal outcomes, leading to a greater combined gain from the 
merger. In untabulated tests, we follow Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and measure long-term value 
creation using the post-acquisition stock performance of the acquiring firm over the three-period 
following the year of acquisition. The results (untabulated) indicate that HireTargetEx has no 
significant effect on the long-term stock performance.  
In column (3), we use OLS regression analysis to examine how the use of targets’ ex-advisors 
affects the division of synergy gain between acquirer and target.21 The dependent variable (TSOS) 
in column (3) is target’s share of synergy. The control variables are the same as those in the 
premium and synergy regressions.  
The results in column (3) suggest that the target’s share of synergy (TSOS) is negatively and 
significantly related to acquirers’ choice to hire targets’ ex-advisors, consistent with the 
“information advantage” hypothesis which predicts that target firms are at a bargaining 
disadvantage when their ex-advisors are hired by acquiring firms. The coefficient of HireTargetEx, 
-0.48, suggests that hiring targets’ ex-advisors on average reduces target shareholders’ share of 
synergy by 0.48. This negative effect is substantial given that the mean and median values of TSOS 
are 1.5 and 1.01, respectively. In untabulated tests, we follow Bates, Lemmon, and Linck (2006) 
and consider the relative target’s share of synergy (RTSOS), which is calculated as the share of 
synergy to target shareholders relative to their proportional share of the firm owned prior to the bid. 
That is, RTSOS = TSOS/(1-α). RTSOS measures the proportional gains for target shareholders 
relative to their pre-bid ownership of the target. The results (untabulated) indicate that 
                                                 
21
 Following Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012), we use OLS regression analysis. Our results are qualitatively 
unchanged if Tobit model is used.  
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HireTargetEx has a negative and significant effect on RTSOS as well (the coefficient of 
HireTargetEx is -0.50; the t-statistic = -2.4), indicating that it is target’s pre-bid shareholders who 
bear the brunt of diminished share of value created by the transaction. Taken together, our analysis 
reveals that although hiring targets’ ex-advisors does not create more synergies, it does help the 
acquiring firms to achieve significant bargaining advantage in merger transactions and capture a 
higher share of merger synergies. 
 
V. Tests for Endogeneity and Additional Analysis 
In this section, we perform addititonal anlaysis to address the endoegeneity issues and examine 
the robustness of our results. We tabulate the results in Table 7. While all control variables in 
Tables 4-6 are still included in the new tests, for the sake of brevity, we only tabulate the 
coefficients of HireTargetEx, TargetHasEx, and the newly added variables. 
 
A. Tests for Endogeneity 
So far, we have performed plain vanilla OLS regressions which assume that acquirer’s advisor 
choice is exogenously determined. Thus, our results are potentially subject to two types of 
endogeneity. The first type is omitted variable bias. While we have controlled for a standard set of 
variables that have been shown by previous studies to affect takeover competition and deal 
outcomes, the relation we observe may be spurious if our model omits any variables that affect 
both the advisor choice and merger outcomes. The other possible endogeneity issue is reverse 
causality. For instance, it is possible that acquiring firms are more likely to hire target firms’ ex-
advisors if target firms have weak negotiation power due to poor operating performance, leading 
to a negative association between HireTargetEx and CAR or premium for target firms. In both cases, 
the coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions are biased and inconsistent.  
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We employ a two-step treatment method to address the endogeneity issues regarding the results 
reported in Tables 5 and 6. The first-step uses the probit regression in Column 5 of Table 3 to 
estimate the probability of acquirers hiring targets’ ex-advisors. We then obtain the inverse Mills 
ratio (IMR) from the first stage and use it as an additional explanatory variable in the second stage 
regression that examine the impact of hiring targets’ ex-advisors on deal outcomes. Convincingly 
implementing the treatment effect model requires at least one variable in the first stage equation 
can be excluded from the set of independent variables in the second stage regression (so called 
exclusion restrictions). In Table 3, we use the number of advisors hired by target firms in the past 
five years to meet exclusion restrictions.22 However, since probit and negative binomial regressions 
in Table 4 are nonlinear models to which the treatment effect adjustments cannot be applied, we 
instead employ a two-step bootstrapping approach, which involves predicting the likelihood of 
hiring targets’ ex-advisors in the first stage using the specification in Column 5 of Table 3, and 
using the predicted value in the second stage. We bootstrap the estimation 500 times to obtain 
consistent standard errors and report the coefficients’ 95% confidence interval estimates in the 
Table 7 (Panel A).  
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
The results of the second stage of the two-step analysis are reported in Panel A of Table 7. The 
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for HireTargetEx does not span zero in the regression with 
the dependent variable MultiBidder, indicating that the coefficient estimate on HireTargetEx is 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for 
                                                 
22
 We select the exclusion restrictions in a manner similar to Fang (2005) and Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012). 
For example Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012) argue that endogeneity is a concern when analyzing whether 
firms hire reputable M&A advisors. The authors use the variable “scope” as the exclusion restriction (which indicates 
the extent to which the reputable bank of the M&A deal has served the firm for equity, bond, and acquisition issues 
during the past five years) and then assume that a firm is more likely to hire reputable bank as its M&A advisor if it 
has experience with hiring reputable banks in the past.  
   29  
HireTargetEx spans zero in the regression with the dependent variable NBidder, however, the 90% 
confidence interval (untabulated) suggests that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. In 
sum, the bootstrapped coefficients of HireTargetEx are generally consistent with those obtained 
using OLS regressions, mitigating the concern that endogeneity drives our results.  
 
B. Simulation Analysis 
To further mitigate the concern that acquirers hire targets’ ex-advisors simply because these 
advisors are active in the takeover market, we conduct a simulation analysis in which acquiring 
firms are assumed to randomly choose M&A advisors based on advisor’s market share. In other 
words, an advisor’s probability of being chosen by an acquiring firm is set equal to the market 
share of the advisor in the previous year. Based on the simulated pairing of advisors and acquiring 
firms, we construct the hypothetical bank-firm advisory relationship for each M&A transaction, 
and define simulated HireTargetEx accordingly. We bootstrap the simulation 500 times to obtain 
consistent standard errors and report the average coefficients and coefficients’ 95% confidence 
interval in Panel B of Table 7. Across 500 simulations, on average, 29 of 3,251 deals have simulated 
advisors being targets ex-advisors. More importantly, the regression results show that the simulated 
HireTargetEx is statistically insignificant in regressions because the bootstrapped 95% confidence 
interval for HireTargetEx spans zero, suggesting that our results are unlikely to be driven by 
acquiring firms’ random choice of advisors based on advisor’s market shares. 
 
C. Targets Hire Acquirers’ Ex-advisors 
While we have shown that acquirers can gain information and bargaining advantage by hiring 
targets’ ex-advisors, can target firms counteract their disadvantages by hiring acquirers’ ex-
advisors? Our sample includes 1,544 deals in which acquirers have ex-advisors from past M&A 
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transactions. Target firms hire acquirers’ ex-advisors in 199 deals. To examine whether target firms 
can benefit from hiring acquirers’ ex-advisors, we augment our regression models by including 
two new variables, HireAcquirerEx and AcquirerHasEx. HireAcquirerEx, is equal to one if the 
target firm hires an advisor who advised the acquiring firm in past M&A transactions, and zero 
otherwise. AcquirerHasEx, is set equal to one if the acquiring firm has ex-advisors, and zero 
otherwise. We include AcquirerHasEx as a control variable to account for the possibility that some 
acquirers may not have ex-advisors for target firms to select from.  
The results reported in Panel C of Table 7 suggest that hiring acquirers’ ex-advisors has no 
significant effect on CAR of target firms, synergy, merger premium received by target firms, and 
targets’ share of synergies. In addition, hiring acquirers’ ex-advisors tends to reduce rather than 
increase competition among potential bidders. Taken together, our results indicate that target firms 
gain no discernible advantage through hiring acquirers’ ex-advisors. We argue that hiring merger 
counterparties’ ex-advisors has completely different implications for acquirers and targets. 
Although target firms may also have incentives to gain information or bargaining advantage by 
hiring acquirers’ ex-advisors, the incentives come with one big caveat – as target firms normally 
cease to exist as standalone companies after successful mergers, they cannot use the promise of 
future businesses to incentivize acquirers’ ex-advisors. Additionally, acquirers’ ex-advisors hired 
by targets may not be able to have future business from the surviving firms if their services (to the 
target firms) are perceived to diminish the acquirers’ gains. In contrast, acquirers can use the 
promise of future business to motivate targets’ ex-advisors to work hard on their behalf, as evident 
by the statistic (untabulated) that in our sample 58% of these banks (targets’ ex-advisors) are hired 
as advisors by acquirers in future merger transactions.  
  
D. Robustness Checks 
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To check the robustness of our main results, we conduct several additional tests. First, our 
sample includes 3,251 merger deals undertaken by publicly listed and US domiciled firms between 
1985 and 2008. However, due to missing values of dependent and explanatory variables, the sample 
size varies a lot across different tables. As a robustness check, we exclude observations with 
missing value of any dependent and explanatory variables in Tables 4-6 and re-estimate all 
regressions. Although we end up with a much smaller sample that consists of 1,500 deals, our 
results are qualitatively unchanged and reported in Panel D of Table 7.23 
Throughout our analysis, we have controlled TargetHasEx in regressions to address the 
selection issue that acquiring companies may not have a chance to hire targets’ ex-advisors if target 
firms have not engaged any advisors in the past. To check whether our results are sensitive to 
inclusion of this variable, we remove TargetHasEx from the models, re-estimate all regressions, 
and report the coefficients of HireTargetEx in Panel E of Table 7. Our main results are essentially 
unaffected. In Panel F, we also control for targets' advisor choice in regression analysis. Allen et 
al. (2004), Forte, Iannotta, and Navone (2010), and Ma (2013) include targets’ decision to hire 
advisors and advisors’ reputation in their studies of abnormal stock returns around merger 
announcements. Following these studies, we account for the presence and reputation of targets’ 
advisors by including two dummy variables for targets who use at least one advisor and targets 
who use at least one top-tier advisor respectively. As suggested by Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos 
(2012), we refer to the top eight investment banks with largest market shares as top-tier, and all 
other advisors as non-top-tier. We include these two variables and re-estimate all regressions. 
Qualitatively similar results ensue. 
                                                 
23
 In this small sample of 1,500 deals, acquirers hire targets’ ex-advisors in 39 deals, which accounts for 10.0% of 391 
deals in which target firms have ex-advisors and 2.6% of all deals (1,500). 
   32  
It is possible that acquiring firms hire targets’ ex-advisors because these advisors are too large 
to avoid. Targets’ ex-advisors may be reputable investment banks or have large market shares in 
the target firm’s industry. As a result, HireTargetEx may simply capture the effect of advisor’s 
merger expertise in a certain industry or the effect of advisors’ market share. To address this 
concern, in Panel G of Table 7, we control for two additional advisor characteristics. Industry 
Merger Expertise of Acquirer’s Advisor is computed as the number of mergers advised by a bank 
for a firm’s four-digit SIC industry divided by the total number of mergers in the industry during 
the past five years. By construction, it takes a value between zero and one. If there were no mergers 
in the industry over the past five years, all banks are assigned a value zero for industry expertise. 
Top-tier Acquirer Advisor is a dummy variable and it equals one if the firm hires a top-tier advisor, 
and zero otherwise. Our main results still hold, suggesting that our findings are not driven by 
advisor’s merger expertise or advisor’s reputation. Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we 
control for advisors’ market share, which is defined as the fraction of total transactions that have 
been advised by a bank in the previous year. 
Target-advisor relationships may exist not only in mergers but also in other forms of corporate 
finance activities such as securities underwriting and corporate lending, providing additional 
avenues from which the advisors may obtain value-relevant information about the targets. In order 
to include such possibilities in our estimation of target-advisor relationship, we identify targets’ 
ex-advisors in underwriting and lending, and construct TargetHasExUnderwriter and 
TargetHasExLender to indicate if the target has former underwriting and lending-based 
relationships with our sample banks over past five years. We construct underwriting and lending-
based relationship using SDC and DealScan database respectively. We also define 
HireTargetExUnderwriter and HireTargetExLender to indicate if the acquirer hires one of these 
banks as a merger advisor. We re-run our regression models including these additional  variables 
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and results are reported in Panel H of Table 7 and indicate that acquires’ decision to hire targets’ 
ex-advisors in mergers continues to have significant impact on deal outcomes including the 
intensity of competition, targets’ CAR and share of synergy, and merger premiums. On the other 
hand, hiring targets’ ex-underwriters or ex-lenders has no significant effect on the deal outcomes. 
The finding implies that compared to target firms’ ex-underwriters and ex-lenders, its ex-advisors 
in mergers inherently offer acquirers more value relevant services because of their experience of 
valuing target firms and expertise of identifying synergy in past M&A transactions. For example, 
underwriters specialize in collecting information from institutional investors during book-building 
and offer after-market support to the issuing firms, and may not be familiar with valuing a target 
firm in M&A. Besides, underwriting normally is done by underwriting teams in investment banks, 
while the M&A advisory is performed by M&A teams. Our results (or lack thereof) suggest that 
any potential information transmission between two teams in the same bank may not be particularly 
effective. 
Besides the two-step analysis in Panel A, we perform the following tests to address the omitted 
variable bias. First, we include advisor fixed effects in models for Tables 4-6 and report the result 
in Panel I of Table 7.  Our main findings are robust to the inclusion of advisor fixed effects. Second, 
it is possible that acquirers’ decision to hire targets’ ex-advisors is related to general market 
conditions. Acquirers are likely to overpay the targets when an industry is hot for mergers and 
firms there are likely to be overvalued. For example, Moeller et al. (2005) find that acquirer CARs 
are more negative when they acquire targets in industries with more intensive corporate control 
transactions. Following Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) and Moeller et al. (2005), we 
define the liquidity index for the target (for a year) as the value of corporate control transactions 
divided by the total book value of assets of firms in the 2-digit SIC code for that year. We include 
the liquidity index in models for Tables 4-6 and report the result in Panel J of Table 7. Our main 
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results are robust to the inclusion of the liquidity index. Finally, it is possible that acquirers hire 
targets’ ex-advisors in complex deals or deals involving asset-specific targets in order to resolve 
uncertainty over the targets’ assets. The impact of acquirers’ decision to hire targets’ ex-advisors 
on the degree of competition may therefore be driven by targets’ industry-specificity and firm-
specificity.24 We follow Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2011) to define machinery intensity 
as the ratio of machinery and equipment to total firm assets, then construct industry asset-
specificity by averaging machinery intensity by years within three-digit SIC industries, and define 
firm-specificity as the ratio of used-to-total fixed depreciable capital expenditures by firms in an 
industry. We first re-run the models in Tables 4-6 with firm-specificity included. The result 
indicates that our main findings remain unaffected after controlling for firm-specificity (Panel K1). 
We then classify industries into high asset specificity and low asset specificity, and re-run these 
models. Our main findings are indeed stronger in industries with low asset specificity (Panel K2) 
rather than in industries with high asset specificity (Panel K3), suggesting that low propensity and 
intensity of competition in deals where acquirers hire targets’ ex-advisors is unlikely to be driven 
by targets’ difficulty in redeploying highly specific assets. 
 
E. Additional Analysis 
We also examine whether acquirers pay a fee premium in exchange for services provided by 
targets’ ex-advisors. We define the total advisory fee as a percentage of deal value and then regress 
it on the independent variables used in Table 6. The results (untabulated) suggest that there is no 
significant fee premium when targets’ ex-advisors are hired by acquirers. However, this does not 
                                                 
24
 We thank the referee for pointing out this possibility.  
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necessarily mean that these advisors obtain no benefit - in our sample about 58% of these banks 
are hired as advisors by acquirers in future merger transactions. 
Furthermore, we examine whether hiring merger-counterparty’s ex-advisors impacts the 
probability of deal completion and time to resolution. To capture deal completion, we use a dummy 
variable which is equal to one for completed transactions, and zero for withdrawn bids. Time to 
resolution is defined as the number of calendar days between the announcement and resolution 
(completion or withdrawal) dates. Under the deal improvement hypothesis, having information 
about targets and acquirers and the ability to influence both sides of deals allows targets’ ex-
advisors to complete deals more quickly. However, we find no evidence to support the notion that 
using targets’ ex-advisors impact either the likelihood of deal completion or the time to resolution.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper examines acquiring firms’ choice to hire targets’ ex-advisors. Our analysis suggests 
that hiring targets’ ex-advisors indeed provides benefits to the merging firms, but these benefits are 
distributed asymmetrically between them. Our results suggest that hiring targets’ ex-advisors 
provides the acquirers with a better understanding of targets’ true value and helps them to identify 
the sources of synergy. These acquirers also face reduced competition from outside (less informed) 
bidders who may be concerned with being susceptible to the winner’s curse. Both the likelihood of 
competing bids, as well as the number of competing bidders is reduced when the targets’ ex-
advisors are hired by acquirers. Acquirers who hire targets’ ex-advisors pay lower premiums, 
although their own abnormal returns are unaffected. Concurrently, targets’ abnormal returns are 
lower, as is their share of synergies. The above results are robust for alternative model 
specifications, estimation methods, and tests for endogeneity. We do not, however, obtain 
comparable results when targets hire acquirers’ ex-advisors. Overall, we conclude that firms’ 
   36  
decisions to hire the merger counterparties’ ex-advisors to advise on current mergers has significant, 
albeit one-sided, benefits for some participants in such transactions. 
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Table 1: Most Active Advisors for Acquiring Firms  
This table presents the twenty five most active financial advisors for acquiring firms in our sample in terms 
of transaction value in US$ billion. The sample consists of 3,251 M&A transactions in SDC/Platinum 
between US public firms during the period of 1985-2008. We require that acquirers own less than 50% of 
targets’ shares before the announcement date and own 100% after the deal completion, and employ at least 
one advisor from the list in Appendix A. Column (1) reports the total value of all mergers advised by the 
bank and its predecessors. Column (2) reports the total number of all mergers advised by the bank and its 
predecessors. If there is more than one bank advising the acquirer in a transaction, each participating bank 
will get 1/n share of deal value or 1/n of the count, where n is the number of advisors. Column (3) reports 
the number of deals in which the target firm hired advisors in M&A transactions during the past five years, 
i.e., the variable, TargetHasEx, is equal to 1. Columns (4) and (5) presents the number of deals and the value 
of deals in which the acquirer’s advisor advised target firms in past five years M&A transactions, i.e., the 
variable, HireTargetEx, is equal to 1.  
 
 
Rank Advisor Names (1) 
Transaction 
Value ($billion) 
(2)  
No. of  
Deals 
(3)  
No. of  
Deals with 
TargetHasEx = 1 
(4)  
No. of  
Deals with  
HireTargetEx = 1 
(5)  
Transaction 
Value ($billion) of  
Deals with  
HireTargetEx = 1 
1 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 1,002 420 105 10 156.79 
2 JP Morgan 821 275 85 2 5.98 
3 Citigroup 793 299 80 9 171.20 
4 Goldman Sachs 786 282 81 14 151.03 
5 Credit Suisse 617 356 95 12 16.77 
6 Morgan Stanley 577 263 65 4 2.42 
7 Lehman Brothers (Barclays Capital) 388 185 50 4 27.13 
8  UBS 188 161 36 3 35.10 
9 Lazard 173 63 16 2 4.08 
10 Deutsche Bank 91 99 15 2 2.43 
11 Dresdner Bank (Commerzbank) 65 26 8 0 0 
12 Wachovia (Wells Fargo) 54 72 9 0 0 
13 Keefe, Bruyette and Woods 40 108 19 3 4.29 
14 Blackstone 33 8 1 0 0 
15 Stephens Inc. 32 16 4 0 0 
16 Oppenheimer Holdings 29 30 6 0 0 
17 Drexel Burnham Lambert 27 45 10 2 1.09 
18 Thomas Weisel Partners 22 15 1 0 0 
19 Sandler O'Neill Partners 21 74 8 1 0.17 
20 Houlihan Lokey 20 17 4 1 0.35 
21 Greenhill 18 8 2 0 0 
22 Allen & Company 16 6 3 0 0 
23 Evercore Partners 16 4 2 0 0 
24 Peter J Solomon 14 6 1 0 0 
25 William Blair 12 11 2 0 0 
 Below top 25 268 403 54 4 2.55 
  
     
 Total  6,122 3,251 760 73 581.38 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
The sample consists of M&A transactions in SDC/Platinum between US public firms during the period of 
1985-2008. We require that acquirers own less than 50% of targets’ shares before the announcement date 
and own 100% after the deal completion, and employ at least one advisor from the list in Appendix A. CAR 
is three-day cumulative abnormal return calculated using the market model. Premium is measured as the 
initial offer price (or final price if initial price unavailable) as reported by SDC, deflated by the share price 
of the target at five trading days preceding the announcement date, less one. NBidders is the number of 
competing bidders. Synergy is the total dollar-denominated synergy scaled by the pre-bid market 
capitalization of the acquiring firm. ASOS and TSOS are the acquirer’s and target’s share of synergies, 
respectively. Tender Offer equals one for tender offers, and zero otherwise. Relative Size is the deal value 
divided by the acquirer’s market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Diversify equals one if the acquirer and target have different four-digit SIC codes reported 
by SDC and zero otherwise. Hostile equals one if the SDC classifies the acquisition as a hostile takeover, 
and zero if the SDC classifies the acquisition as a friendly takeover. Percentage of Cash is the percentage 
of deal value that is paid with cash. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Leverage 
is (Short-term debt + long-term debt)/total assets. M/B is the market-to-book asset ratio. Free cash flow 
(CashFlow) is operating income before depreciation - interest expense - income taxes - capital expenditures, 
scaled by book value of total assets. Columns 1-3 summarize the deal and firm characteristics for the whole 
sample. In columns 4-7, the transactions are grouped into two subsamples according to whether the 
acquirer’s advisor advised the target firm in M&A transactions (HireTargetEx = 1) or not (HireTargetEx = 
0) during the past five years. The symbols, *, **, and ***, indicate that subsample means (medians) are 
significantly different from each other at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
All Deals  
(N = 3,251) 
HireTargetEx = 0 
(N = 3,178) 
HireTargetEx = 1  
(N = 73) 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation Mean Median Mean Median 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics 
CARAcquirer -0.02 -0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
CARTarget 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.13*** 0.11** 
Premium 0.31 0.28 0.23 0.32 0.28 0.25*** 0.21*** 
NBidders 0.11 0.00 0.39 0.11 0.00 0.15 0.00 
Synergy 0.01 0.03 0.36 0.02 0.01 -0.01* -0.01 
TSOS 1.50 1.01 1.71 1.50 1.02 1.34 0.94 
ASOS -0.50 -0.01 1.71 -0.50 -0.02 -0.34 0.06 
Tender Offer 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.19 0.00 0.14 0.00 
Relative Size 0.69 0.36 1.05 0.69 0.36 0.85 0.57* 
Diversify 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.48 0.00 0.53 1.00 
Hostile 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.00 
Percentage of Cash 0.35 0.00 0.42 0.35 0.00 0.26** 0.00 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Ln (Assets) Acquirer 7.46 7.45 1.98 7.44 7.43 8.50*** 8.66*** 
LeverageAcquirer 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.28** 0.27** 
M/BAcquirer 2.15 1.40 2.73 2.15 1.40 1.94 1.48 
CashFlow Acquirer -0.06 0.04 0.67 -0.05 0.04 -0.18 0.03 
Ln (Assets)Target  6.10 6.00 1.85 6.06 5.97 7.59*** 7.17*** 
LeverageTarget 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.29** 0.24 
M/BTarget 1.90 1.32 1.96 1.91 1.32 1.65** 1.32 
CashFlow Target -0.07 0.02 0.62 -0.07 0.02 -0.05 0.03 
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Table 3: Determinants of Hiring Targets’ Ex-advisors 
We estimate a probit model to estimate the probability that acquirers hire targets’ ex-advisors (HireTargetEx 
= 1) of M&A transactions in SDC/Platinum between US public firms during the period of 1985-2008. We 
require that acquirers own less than 50% of targets’ shares before the announcement date and own 100% 
after the deal completion, and employ at least one advisor from the list in Appendix A. Acquirer’s Expertise 
in Target’s Industry is defined as the number of mergers done by an acquirer in its target’s four-digit SIC 
industry divided by the total number of mergers in the industry involved during the past five years. Relative 
Bargaining Power is defined as the ratio of the natural logarithm of total assets of the acquirer to that of the 
target. We construct three variables Recency, Duration, and BankMerged to measure the closeness of the 
relationship between targets’ and their ex-advisors. The duration of a deal as the time elapsed (in years) 
between the announcement date and the completion date, divided by five. Further, for a current deal under 
consideration, the recency of relationship between the target and its ex-advisor is defined as five minus the 
time elapsed (in years) between the origination date of the relationship and the announcement date of the 
current deal. As only consider mergers within past five years for the current deal are considered, both 
duration and recency take a maximum value of one. For deals within previous two year, recency is set to 
zero. For a current deal under consideration, Duration and Recency, are defined as the average duration and 
recency of all target’s ex-advisors within past five years. Additionally, an indicator for bank merger is 
defined for mergers of any target’s ex-advisors since their previous engagements with the target. Then, for 
a current deal under consideration, BankMerged is defined as the ratio of all bank mergers related to all 
target’s ex-advisors within past five years. Other deal and firm characteristics are defined in the legend of 
Table 2. The z-statistics in parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/Sandwich heteroskedastic 
consistent errors, which are also corrected for correlation across observations for a given firm. The symbols 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of Advisors Hired by Target in 0.71*** 0.68*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.58*** 
the Past Five Years (11.5) (10.3) (10.1) (10.2) (8.4) 
Recency  0.73**   0.87*** 
  (2.1)   (3.3) 
Duration 
 
 2.10***  1.46* 
  
 (2.9)  (1.9) 
BankMerged    -0.55** -0.44** 
    (-2.5) (-2.0) 
Number of Advisors Hired by Firm in the  0.11 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.14* 
Current Deal (1.2) (1.3) (1.1) (1.4) (1.7) 
Acquirer’s Expertise in Target’s Industry -2.25*** -2.51*** -2.53*** -2.42*** -2.73*** 
 (-2.8) (-2.9) (-3.1) (-2.8) (-3.2) 
Relative Bargaining Power 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (3.0) (3.1) (3.1) (2.8) (2.7) 
Tender Offer -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
 (-0.0) (-0.1) (0.1) (-0.2) (-0.2) 
Relative Size 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
 (0.6) (0.6) (0.3) (0.6) (0.5) 
Diversify 0.33** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 
 (2.6) (2.6) (2.7) (2.7) (2.7) 
Hostile -0.16 -0.11 -0.22 -0.10 -0.04 
 (-0.6) (-0.4) (-0.8) (-0.4) (-0.1) 
Percentage of Cash -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 
 (-0.4) (-0.4) (-0.3) (-0.4) (-0.1) 
Observations 3,056 3,056 3,056 3,056 3,056 
Pseudo R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.35 
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Table 4: The Effects of Hiring Targets’ Ex-advisors on Takeover Competition 
The sample consists of M&A transactions in SDC/Platinum between US public firms during the period of 
1985-2008. We require that acquirers own less than 50% of targets’ shares before the announcement date 
and own 100% after the deal completion, and employ at least one advisor from the list in Appendix A. In 
column (1), the dependent variable is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if multiple bidders exist, and 
zero otherwise. The probit model is estimated and marginal effects of coefficients are reported. In column 
(2), the dependent variable is the number of the rival bidders (NBidders) and the econometric method used 
is the negative binomial regression. Toehold Dummy is equal to 1 if acquirer’s ownership in the target at the 
announcement date is larger than 5%. Premium is measured as the initial offer price (or final price if initial 
price unavailable) as reported by SDC, deflated by the share price of the target at five trading days preceding 
the announcement date, less one. Percentage of Cash is the percentage of deal value that is paid with cash. 
Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Leverage is (Short-term debt + long-term 
debt)/total assets. M/B is the market-to-book asset ratio. Free cash flow (CashFlow) is operating income 
before depreciation - interest expense - income taxes - capital expenditures, scaled by book value of total 
assets. All explanatory variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year immediately before the acquisition 
announcement date. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 0.5% level at both tails of their 
distributions. Constant terms, year fixed effects, and industry fixed effects are included in the regressions 
but not reported. The z-statistics in parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/Sandwich 
heteroskedastic consistent errors, which are also corrected for correlation across observations for a given 
deal. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) 
 Probit Negative Binomial  
 MultiBidder NBidders 
HireTargetEx -0.03** -0.89** 
 (-2.1) (-2.0) 
TargetHasEx 0.01 0.25 
 (0.7) (1.6) 
Toehold Dummy -0.03** -1.08** 
 (-2.1) (-2.0) 
Premium -0.03* -0.56 
 (-1.7) (-1.6) 
Percentage of Cash 0.04*** 0.80*** 
 (4.8) (4.0) 
LeverageTarget  -0.06*** -1.16*** 
 (-2.7) (-2.7) 
Ln(Assets)Target 0.02*** 0.28*** 
 (5.5) (5.3) 
M/BTarget -0.01* -0.26** 
 (-1.8) (-2.1) 
CashFlowTarget 0.01 0.35 
 (1.4) (1.3) 
Observations 1,736 1,736 
Pseudo R-squared 0.20 0.17 
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Table 5: The Effect of Hiring Targets’ Ex-advisors on Announcement Returns  
The sample consists of M&A transactions in SDC/Platinum between US public firms during the period of 
1985-2008. We require that acquirers own less than 50% of targets’ shares before the announcement date 
and own 100% after the deal completion, and employ at least one advisor from the list in Appendix A. CAR 
is three-day cumulative abnormal return calculated using the market model. The dependent variables in 
columns (1) and (2) are target’s and acquirer’s CAR, respectively. Firms characteristics (Ln(Assets), M/B, 
Leverage, CashFlow) are measured for targets and acquirers, respectively in columns (1) and (2). The 
detailed definitions of other variables are in the legend of Table 2. All explanatory variables are measured 
at the end of the fiscal year immediately before the acquisition announcement date. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 0.5% level at both tails of their distributions. Constant terms, year fixed effects, and 
industry fixed effects are included in the regressions but not reported. The z-statistics in parentheses are 
calculated from the Huber/White/Sandwich heteroskedastic consistent errors, which are also corrected for 
correlation across observations for a given deal. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) 
 CARTarget CARAcquirer 
HireTargetEx -0.06** 0.01 
 (-2.3) (0.5) 
TargetHasEx 0.00 -0.01*** 
 (0.4) (-2.6) 
Tender Offer 0.06*** -0.00 
 (3.8) (-0.4) 
Relative Size -0.02*** -0.00 
 (-4.4) (-1.0) 
Diversify -0.01 -0.00 
 (-0.6) (-0.3) 
Hostile 0.03** -0.01 
 (2.1) (-1.2) 
Percentage of Cash 0.08*** 0.04*** 
 (5.6) (6.9) 
Leverage  -0.02 0.01 
 (-0.7) (1.1) 
Ln(Assets) -0.01 -0.00 
 (-1.5) (-1.5) 
M/B -0.01** -0.00* 
 (-2.2) (-1.9) 
CashFlow 0.03*** 0.00 
 (2.9) (0.3) 
Observations 1,839 2,021 
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.09 
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Table 6: The Effects of Hiring Targets’ Ex-advisors on Takeover Premium and Synergies 
The sample consists of M&A transactions in SDC/Platinum between US public firms during the period of 
1985-2008. We require that acquirers own less than 50% of targets’ shares before the announcement date 
and own 100% after the deal completion, and employ at least one advisor from the list in Appendix A. The 
dependent variable in column (1) is the premium paid by bidders to targets. The dependent variable in 
column (2) is the total dollar value of synergy scaled by the pre-bid market capitalization of the acquiring 
firm. In columns (3), TSOS is the target’s share of synergy. The detailed definitions of other variables are 
in the legend of Table 2. All explanatory variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year immediately 
before the acquisition announcement date. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 0.5% level at both 
tails of their distributions. Constant terms, year fixed effects, and industry fixed effects are included in the 
regressions but not reported. The z-statistics in parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/Sandwich 
heteroskedastic consistent errors, which are also corrected for correlation across observations for a given 
deal. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Premium  Synergy TSOS 
HireTargetEx -0.06** -0.02 -0.48** 
 (-2.0) (-1.2) (-2.3) 
TargetHasEx -0.00 -0.01 -0.13 
 (-0.1) (-1.5) (-1.2) 
LeverageAcquirer -0.02 0.03 -0.18 
 (-0.4) (1.5) (-0.7) 
Ln(Assets)Acquirer 0.02*** -0.01*** 0.01 
 (3.8) (-3.8) (0.2) 
M/BAcquirer 0.01** -0.00** -0.01 
 (2.4) (-2.1) (-0.7) 
CashFlowAcquirer -0.01 -0.00 -0.04 
 (-0.5) (-0.4) (-0.6) 
Tender Offer 0.01 -0.01 0.09 
 (0.7) (-1.1) (0.7) 
Relative Size 0.02** 0.01*** 0.03 
 (2.4) (3.9) (0.5) 
Diversify -0.01 -0.00 -0.06 
 (-0.4) (-0.8) (-0.6) 
Hostile 0.03 0.01 0.09 
 (1.4) (0.5) (0.4) 
Percentage of Cash 0.01 0.05*** -0.48*** 
 (0.8) (6.2) (-3.4) 
LeverageTarget  0.04 -0.02 -0.19 
 (1.2) (-1.5) (-0.8) 
Ln(Assets)Target -0.03*** 0.01*** 0.07 
 (-4.8) (3.7) (1.6) 
M/BTarget -0.02*** -0.00* -0.02 
 (-4.1) (-1.7) (-0.6) 
CashFlowTarget -0.03** 0.01 0.17* 
 (-2.1) (1.6) (1.9) 
Observations 1,514 1,549 1,549 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.15 0.02 
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Table 7: Tests for Endogeneity and Additional Analysis 
The sample consists of M&A transactions in SDC/Platinum between US public firms during the period of 1985-2008. We require that acquirers own 
less than 50% of targets’ shares before the announcement date and own 100% after the deal completion, and employ at least one advisor from the 
list in Appendix A. Panel A reports the tests for endogeneity. The first two columns report the two-stage bootstrapping results and the others are 
regarding the second-stage regression results of the two-step treatment effect model. In the first two columns, 95% confidence intervals of the 
bootstrapped coefficients are reported. IMR is calculated based on column 5 of Table 3. In Panel B, we conduct a simulation analysis in which 
acquiring firms are assumed to randomly choose M&A advisors based on advisor’s market share. In Panel C, we control for two additional dummy 
variables to account for target firm hiring acquirer’s ex-advisor. In Panel D, we exclude deals with missing value for any dependent and explanatory 
variables in Tables 4-6. In Panel E, we exclude TargetHasEx from the regression models. In Panel F, we account for the presence and reputation of 
targets’ advisors by including two dummy variables for targets who use at least one advisor and targets who use at least one top-tier advisor 
respectively. In Panel G, we add Industry Merger Expertise of Acquirer’s Advisor and Top-tier Acquirer Advisor as additional control variables. 
Industry Merger Expertise of Acquirer’s Advisor is computed as the number of mergers advised by a bank for a firm’s four-digit SIC industry divided 
by the total number of mergers in the industry during the past five years. Top-tier Acquirer Advisor is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer 
uses any top-tier advisor, and zero otherwise. In Panel H, we identify targets’ ex-advisors in underwriting and lending, and construct 
TargetHasExUnderwriter and TargetHasExLender to indicate if the target has former underwriting and lending-based relationships with our sample 
banks over past five years. We also define HireTargetExUnderwriter and HireTargetExLender to indicate if the acquirer hires one of these banks as 
a merger advisor. In Panel I, we include advisor fixed effects in models. In Panel J, we define the liquidity index for the target (for a year) as the 
value of corporate control transactions divided by the total book value of assets of firms in the 2-digit SIC code for that year, and include the liquidity 
index in the models. In Panel K, we define machinery intensity as the ratio of machinery and equipment to total firm assets, then construct industry-
specificity by averaging machinery intensity by years within three-digit SIC industries, and define firm-specificity as the ratio of used-to-total fixed 
depreciable capital expenditures by firms in an industry. All regressions include the same control variables as those used in Tables 4-6, but the 
coefficients on control variables are not tabulated. Detailed other variable definitions are in the legend of Table 2. The t-statistics in parentheses are 
calculated from the Huber/White/Sandwich heteroskedastic consistent errors, which are also corrected for correlation across observations for a given 
deal. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables MultiBidder NBidders CARTarget CARAcquirer Premium  Synergy TSOS 
Panel A: Tests for endogeneity 
HireTargetEx -0.05 -0.71 -0.19*** 0.01 -0.14* -0.03 -1.17* 
 [-0.09, -0.00] [-1.52,0.11] (-3.1) (0.4) (-1.8) (-1.1) (-1.9) 
TargetHasEx 0.05 0.49 0.01 -0.01** 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 
 [-0.04, 0.15] [-0.18, 1.15] (1.1) (-2.5) (0.2) (-1.1) (-0.7) 
IMR   0.07** -0.00 0.04 0.01 0.38 
   (2.2) (-0.3) (1.0) (0.7) (1.2) 
Panel B: Randomly choosing M&A advisors based on advisors’ market share 
HireTargetEx (Simulated) 0.02 -0.58 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 
 [-0.07 0.10] [-6.79 5.62] [-0.10 0.07] [-0.04 0.03] [-0.12 0.10] [-0.06 0.05] [-0.87 0.74] 
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TargetHasEx  0.001 0.162 -0.001 -0.012 -0.007 -0.012 -0.172 
 
[-0.012, 
0.014] 
[0.108, 
0.216] 
[-0.004, 
0.002] 
[-0.013, 
-0.010] 
[-0.011, 
-0.003] 
[-0.014, 
-0.010] 
[-0.201,  
-0.143] 
Panel C: Targets hiring acquirers’ ex-advisors 
HireTargetEx -0.03** -0.90** -0.06** 0.01 -0.06** -0.02 -0.48** 
 (-2.2) (-2.1) (-2.3) (0.4) (-2.1) (-1.2) (-2.3) 
TargetHasEx 0.01 0.23 0.00 -0.01** -0.00 -0.01 -0.13 
 (0.7) (1.5) (0.3) (-2.5) (-0.1) (-1.5) (-1.2) 
HireAcquirerEx -0.03** -0.56 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-2.2) (-1.5) (-0.9) (0.0) (-1.2) (-0.6) (-0.1) 
AcquirerHasEx 0.01 0.14 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 (1.1) (1.0) (1.2) (-0.9) (0.0) (-0.2) (-0.1) 
Panel D: Unified sample that includes deals with no missing values for all variables in Tables 4-6 
HireTargetEx -0.04** -0.96** -0.05 -0.00 -0.06** -0.01 -0.46** 
 (-2.1) (-2.3) (-1.6) (-0.3) (-2.0) (-0.8) (-2.1) 
TargetHasEx 0.01 0.17 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.11 
 (0.5) (1.0) (-0.2) (-1.6) (-0.0) (-1.6) (-1.0) 
Panel E: Excluding TargetHasEx 
HireTargetEx -0.03* -0.75* -0.06** -0.00 -0.06** -0.03 -0.56*** 
 (-1.9) (-1.7) (-2.3) (-0.2) (-2.2) (-1.6) (-2.8) 
Panel F: Controlling for presence and reputation of targets’ advisors 
HireTargetEx -0.03** -0.89** -0.06** 0.01 -0.06** -0.02 -0.49** 
 (-2.0) (-2.0) (-2.3) (0.4) (-2.1) (-1.2) (-2.3) 
TargetHasEx 0.01 0.25 0.00 -0.01** -0.00 -0.01 -0.12 
 (0.8) (1.6) (0.4) (-2.4) (-0.0) (-1.6) (-1.1) 
Target Hires Advisor -0.03 -0.50 0.02 -0.00 -0.03 0.02* -0.28 
 (-1.6) (-1.6) (1.3) (-0.1) (-1.4) (1.8) (-1.5) 
Top-tier Target Advisor 0.02 0.26 -0.02* -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01* 0.13 
 (1.6) (1.1) (-1.7) (-2.7) (-0.0) (-1.7) (1.2) 
Panel G: Controlling for additional advisor characteristics 
HireTargetEx -0.03** -0.89** -0.06** 0.01 -0.06** -0.02 -0.49** 
 (-2.1) (-2.0) (-2.3) (0.5) (-2.0) (-1.1) (-2.3) 
TargetHasEx 0.01 0.25 0.00 -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.13 
 (0.8) (1.6) (0.4) (-2.7) (-0.1) (-1.5) (-1.2) 
Industry Merger Expertise of 0.04 0.76 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.30 
Acquirer’s Advisor (1.2) (1.5) (0.3) (0.2) (-0.2) (-0.9) (0.8) 
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Top-tier Acquirer Advisor -0.01 -0.17 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.12 
 (-0.9) (-0.8) (0.6) (0.9) (-0.7) (0.8) (-1.0) 
Panel H: Hiring target’s ex-underwriters & ex-lenders 
HireTargetEx -0.03* -0.83* -0.07*** 0.00 -0.07** -0.02 -0.51** 
 (-2.0) (-1.8) (-2.6) (0.4) (-2.4) (-1.4) (-2.4) 
TargetHasEx 0.01 0.25 0.01 -0.01** 0.00 -0.01 -0.12 
 (0.7) (1.6) (0.5) (-2.6) (0.0) (-1.5) (-1.1) 
HireTargetExUnderwriter -0.00 -0.17 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.09 
 (-0.4) (-0.7) (1.3) (0.3) (1.0) (1.0) (0.5) 
TargetHasExUnderwriter 0.01 0.21 -0.00 -0.01* -0.02* -0.00 -0.02 
 (1.3) (1.1) (-0.4) (-1.8) (-1.8) (-0.1) (-0.2) 
HireTargetExLender -0.01 -0.33 -0.02 0.01 -0.07*** 0.00 -0.16 
 (-1.1) (-1.2) (-1.0) (1.0) (-3.4) (0.3) (-0.8) 
TargetHasExLender 0.01 0.28* 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01** 0.05 
 (1.3) (1.8) (0.7) (0.3) (1.5) (2.0) (0.5) 
Panel I: Including acquirer advisor fixed effect 
HireTargetEx -0.01** -0.91** -0.06** 0.01 -0.06** -0.02 -0.47** 
 (-2.0) (-2.0) (-2.0) (0.4) (-2.0) (-1.1) (-2.1) 
TargetHasEx 0.00 0.28* 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01 -0.01* -0.13 
 (0.8) (1.7) (0.2) (-2.8) (-0.4) (-1.8) (-1.2) 
Panel J: Including liquidity index for the target 
HireTargetEx -0.03** -0.89** -0.06** 0.01 -0.06** -0.02 -0.48** 
 (-2.0) (-2.0) (-2.3) (0.5) (-2.0) (-1.2) (-2.3) 
TargetHasEx 0.01 0.24 0.00 -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.13 
 (0.7) (1.5) (0.4) (-2.6) (-0.1) (-1.4) (-1.2) 
Liquidity Index 0.01** 0.03 -0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.01 -0.04** 
 (2.3) (1.0) (-1.5) (-1.8) (0.4) (-1.5) (-2.0) 
Panel K1: Including target firm specificity 
HireTargetEx -0.03** -0.90** -0.06** -0.01 -0.06** -0.02 -0.49** 
 (-2.1) (-2.0) (-2.3) (-0.7) (-2.1) (-1.1) (-2.3) 
TargetHasEx 0.01 0.25 0.00 -0.01** -0.00 -0.01 -0.12 
 (0.7) (1.6) (0.4) (-2.2) (-0.1) (-1.5) (-1.1) 
Firm specificity -0.00** -0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 
 (-2.0) (-1.0) (1.1) (-0.1) (0.7) (-0.7) (1.1) 
Panel K2: Targets from industries with low asset specificity 
HireTargetEx -0.03* -1.34** -0.07** 0.01 -0.08*** -0.01 -0.69** 
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 (-1.7) (-2.1) (-2.6) (0.8) (-2.6) (-0.6) (-2.5) 
TargetHasEx 0.01 0.18 0.01 -0.01** 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 
 (1.1) (0.9) (0.9) (-2.3) (0.0) (-1.2) (-0.2) 
Panel K3: Targets from industries with high asset specificity 
HireTargetEx -0.00 -0.09 -0.05 -0.05* -0.02 -0.05 0.15 
 (-0.1) (-0.2) (-0.8) (-1.9) (-0.2) (-1.2) (0.5) 
TargetHasEx -0.01 0.24 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.39 
 (-1.2) (1.0) (-0.7) (-0.8) (0.0) (-1.5) (-1.5) 
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Appendix A: Major Bank Mergers in the Banking Industry 
The table summarizes the major merger and acquisition events in the banking industry. The sample banks are selected by forming a union of two 
groups of banks: (1) the sample of Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006); and (2) the sample of 50 most active banks in M&A activities by 
transaction value over the period 1985 to 2008. The effective dates of bank mergers are obtained from Corwin and Schultz (2005) and Ljungqvist, 
Marston, and Wilhelm (2006), supplemented by other financial news sources. The numbers in the brackets following bank names define the 
predecessor-successor relationships among banks. The number at the beginning represents the surviving bank. The first subsequent character (a or 
b) represent one of the two predecessors of the surviving bank. The second, third and fourth characters further define the earlier predecessors. For 
example, Credit Suisse First Boston (2a) and Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette (2b) are predecessors of Credit Suisse (2), the surviving bank. Credit 
Suisse (2aa) and First Boston Corp. (2ab) are predecessors of Credit Suisse First Boston (2a). 
 
Surviving Bank Effective 
date 
Bank 1 Bank 2 
Sample bank from Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006) 
Citigroup/Salomon Smith Barney 
(1) 19860731 Schroders (1aba) Wertheim Holdings (1abb) 
 19971128 Salomon Brothers (1aaba) Smith Barney Inc. (1aabb) 
 19981008 CitiCorp (1aaa) Travelers (1aab) 
 20000501 Salomon Smith Barney Holdings (1aa) Schroders-Worldwide Investment (1ab) 
 20010202 Salomon Smith Barney Holdings (1a) Geneva Companies (1b) 
Credit Suisse (2) 19881222 Credit Suisse (2aa) First Boston Corp. (2ab) 
 20001103 Credit Suisse First Boston (2a) Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette (2b) 
Lehman Brothers (3) 19840510 Shearson/American Express (3aa) Lehman Brothers (3ab) 
(now Barclays Capital) 19880429 Shearson Lehman Brothers (3a) EF Hutton (3b) 
JP Morgan (4) 19920326 Chemical Bank (4aaaaaaa) Manufacturers Hanover Bank (4aaaaaab) 
 19960331 Chemical Bank (4aaaaaa) Chase Manhattan (4aaaaab) 
 19990325 Robert Fleming Hldgs Ltd (4aaaba) Jardine Fleming Group Ltd (4aaabb) 
 19991210 Chase Manhattan Corp. (4aaaaa) Hambrecht & Quist Group (4aaaab) 
 20000411 Chase Manhattan Corp. (4aaaa) Robert Fleming Hldgs Ltd (4aaab) 
 20001231 Chase Manhattan Corp. (4aaa) JP Morgan & Co. (4aab) 
 20040701 JP Morgan Chase & Co. (4aa) Bank One Corp. (4ab) 
 20080530 JP Morgan Chase & Co. (4a)  Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. (4b) 
UBS (5) 19950131 PaineWebber (5baa) Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc.(5bab) 
 19950703 Swiss Bank Corp. (5abaa) SG Warburg Securities (5abab) 
 19970902 SBC Warburg (Swiss Bank Corp.) (5aba) Dillon Read & Co. (5abb) 
 19980629 Union Bank of Switzerland (5aa) Swiss Bank Corp. (5ab) 
 20000612 PaineWebber Group, Inc. (5ba) JC Bradford & Co. (5bb) 
 20001103 UBS AG (5a) Paine Webber Group, Inc. (5b) 
Deutsche Bank (6) 19900330 Deutsche Bank AG (6ba) Morgan Grenfell (6bb) 
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 19960801 James D Wolfensohn Inc. (6aba) Bankers Trust New York Corp. (6abb) 
 19970902 Alex Brown, Inc. (6aa) Bankers Trust New York Corp. (6ab) 
 19990604 BT Alex Brown (6a) Deutsche Bank AG (6b) 
Wachovia Corp. (7) 19980202 First Union Corp. (7aaaa) Wheat First Butcher Singer (7aaab) 
(now Wells Fargo) 19990401 Wachovia Corp. (7aaba) Interstate/Johnson Lane (7aabb) 
 19990731 Prudential Securities (7abaa) Vector Securities Intl., Inc. (7abab) 
 19991231 Prudential Securities (7aba) Volpe Brown Whelan & Co. (7abb) 
 20010904 First Union Corp. (7aaa) Wachovia Corp. (7aab) 
 20030701 Wachovia Corp. (7aa) Prudential Securities (7ab) 
 20071001 Wachovia Corp. (7a) AG Edwards Inc. (7b) 
Oppenheimer Holdings (8) 19890815 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
(8abaa) 
Wood Gundy Inc. (8abab) 
 19971103 CIBC Wood Gundy Securities (8aba) Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.(8abb) 
 20030103 Fahnestock Viner Holdings Inc. (8aa) CIBC Oppenheimer's retail brokerage 
business (the Private Client and U.S. 
Asset Management Divisions) was sold 
(8ab) 
 20080114 Oppenheimer Holdings Inc. (8a) CIBC World Markets-US Businesses (8b) 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch 
(9) 
19920422 BankAmerica Corp. (9aaaaaa) Securities Pacific (9aaaaab) 
 19940901 BankAmerica Corp. (9aaaaa) Continental Bank (9aaaab) 
 19971001 BankAmerica Corp. (9aaaa) Robertson Stephens & Co. (9abbb) 
 19971001 NationsBank Corp. (9aaba) Montgomery Securities (13a) 
 19980202 Fleet Financial Group Inc. (9abaa) Quick & Reilly Group(9abab) 
 19980901  BankBoston Corp. (9abba) Robertson Stephens & Co. (9abbb) 
 19980930 BankAmerica Corp. (9aaa) NationsBank Corp. (9aab) 
 19991001 Fleet Financial Group Inc. (9aba) BankBoston Corp. (9abb) 
 20040401 BankAmerica Corp. (9aa) FleetBoston Financial (9ab) 
 20061218 Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.(9ba)  Petrie Parkman & Co., Inc.(9bb) 
 20090101 Bank of America Corp. (9a) Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.(9b) 
Morgan Stanley (10) 19970531 Dean Witter Discover & Co. (10a) Morgan Stanley Group, Inc. (10b) 
Cowen Group (11) 19980630 Cowen & Co. (11a) Societe Generale Securities (11b) 
 2006 Cowen carved out  
Goldman Sachs (12)    
Thomas Weisel Partners (13) 19980921 Spun off from Montgomery Securities 
(13a) 
 
Other banks which are classified as the top-50 in SDC by transaction value  
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Drexel Burnham Lambert (14) 
Lazard (15)    
Piper Jeffray (16) 19980501 US BanCorp. (16aa) Piper Jaffray Companies (16ab) 
 19990104 US BanCorp. (16a) Libra Investment, Inc. (16b) 
 20031231 US BanCorp. (16x) spun off Piper Jaffray 
(16) 
 
SunTrust Robinson-Humphrey 
(17) 
19980102 SunTrust Banks Inc. (17aa) Equitable Securities Corp. (17ab) 
 20010727 SunTrust Banks Inc. (17a) Robinson-Humphrey (17b) 
Houlihan Lokey (18)    
ABN-AMRO (19) 19950309 ING (19baa) Barings Securities (19bab) 
 19950927 ABN-AMRO Holding N.V. (19aa) Chicago Corporation (19ab) 
 19971008 ING Barings (19ba) Furman Selz LLC (19bb) 
 20010430 ABN-AMRO Holding N.V. (19a) ING Baring-US Operations (19b) 
Dresdner (20) 19950823 Dresdner Bank AG (20aa) Kleinwort Benson (20ab) 
(now Commerzbank) 20010105 Dresdner Bank AG (20a) Wasserstein Perella Group, Inc. (20b) 
Stephens Inc. (21)    
Greenhill (22)    
Jefferies (23) 20010321 Jefferies & Co. (23aaa) Quarterdeck Investment (23aab) 
 20031223 Jefferies Group Inc. (23aa) Broadview Holdings (23ab) 
 20070621 Jefferies & Co. (23a) Putnam Lovell Group Inc. (23b) 
Blackstone (24)    
EverCore Partners (25)    
Allen & Co. (26)    
RBC Capital Market (27) 19980102 Dain Bosworth (27aabaa) Rauscher Pierce Refsnes (27aabab) 
 19980406 Dain Rauscher Corp. (27aaba) Wessels Arnold & Henderson LLC 
(27aabb) 
 20010110 Royal Bank of Canada (27aaa) Dain Rauscher Corp. (27aab) 
 20011101 Royal Bank of Canada (27aa) Tucker Anthony Sutro (27ab) 
 20070111 RBC Capital Market (27a) Daniels & Associates Inc. (27b) 
Stifel Financial Corp. (28) 20020429 Ryan Beck & Co. (28ba) Gruntal & Co. (28bb) 
 20070228 Stifel Financial Corp. (28a) Ryan Beck & Co. (28b) 
KPMG (29)    
Peter J Solomon (30)    
Raymond James (31) 19980511 First Chicago NBD Corp. (31aaa) Roney & Co. (31aab) 
 19981002 First Chicago NBD Corp. (31aa) BANC ONE Corp. (31ab) 
 19990614 Roney Capital Markets (BANC ONE) Raymond James Financial, Inc. (31b) 
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(31a) 
William Blair (32)    
PricewaterhouseCoopers (33) 19980701 Price Waterhouse (33a) Coopers & Lybrand LLC (33b) 
Ernst & Young (34)    
Needham & Co. (35)    
Simmons & Co. (36)    
KeyCorp(37) 19980908 McDonald & Co. Investments, Inc. (37aaa) Essex Capital Markets, Inc. (37aab) 
 19981026 McDonald & Co. Investments, Inc. (37aa) KeyCorp(37ab) 
 19990603 McDonald & Co. Investments, Inc. (37a) Trident Financial Corp. (37b) 
Keefe, Bruyette and Woods (38) 19960508 Keefe, Bruyette and Woods (38a) Charles Webb & Co. (38b) 
Sandler O’Neill Partners (39)    
Alliant Partners (40)    
Austin Associates Inc. (41)    
Robert W Baird & Co. (42)    
Baxter Fentriss & Co. (43)    
BB&T Corp. (44) 19971002 BB&T Corp. (44aaa) Craigie Inc. (44aab) 
 19990326 BB&T Corp. (44aa) Scott & Stringfellow Financial (44ab) 
 20050105 BB&T Corp. (44a) Windsor Group LLC (44b) 
Berkery, Noyes & Co. (45)    
BMO Capital Markets (46) 19871031 Bank of Montreal (46a) Nesbitt Thomson Inc. (46b) 
Brown, Gibbons, Lang & Co. (47)    
Duff & Phelps (48)    
Friedman Billings Ramsey (49)    
Goldsmith Agio Helms & Co. (50)    
Grant Thornton LLP (51)    
Harris Williams & Co. (52)    
Hovde Financial (53)    
Lincoln International (54)    
Morgan Joseph & Co., Inc.(55)    
Morgan Keegan Inc. (56)    
Rothschild (57)    
RSM EquiCo Capital Markets 
(58) 
   
Sperry Mitchell (59)  
Updata Capital Inc. (60) 
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Appendix B: The Distribution of Deals by Year 
This Appendix tabulates the distribution of all deals in our sample by year. Our sample consists of 3,251 
M&A transactions in SDC/Platinum between US public firms during the period of 1985-2008.  We require 
that acquirers own less than 50% of targets’ shares before the announcement date and own 100% after the 
deal completion, and employ at least one advisor from the list in Appendix A.  
 
Year 
Number of 
Deals 
Percentage of 
Sample 
1985 111 3.41 
1986 108 3.32 
1987 99 3.05 
1988 89 2.74 
1989 73 2.25 
1990 41 1.26 
1991 43 1.32 
1992 51 1.57 
1993 87 2.68 
1994 153 4.71 
1995 177 5.44 
1996 218 6.71 
1997 292 8.98 
1998 297 9.14 
1999 268 8.24 
2000 217 6.67 
2001 154 4.74 
2002 94 2.89 
2003 112 3.45 
2004 131 4.03 
2005 115 3.54 
2006 113 3.48 
2007 129 3.97 
2008 79 2.43 
Total 3,251 100 
 
